Introduction
In this paper, we investigate whether the effects of investment banker reputation on acquirer performance vary according to acquirer financial conditions. Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most influential investment projects for companies.
Majority of acquirers and targets will retain investment bankers as their financial advisors. For acquisitions with advisors' involvement, about 50% of the deals are advised by top-tier investment bankers. 1 The effects of bank reputation on acquirer performance has been highlighted by an increasing number of researchers.
Top-tier investment bankers charge much higher advisory fees and are supposed to provide their clients with superior service (Golubov et al., 2012) . However, the empirical evidence on this reputation-quality mechanism remains inconclusive. Some studies find that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not outperform those advised by non-top-tier advisors and may even obtain negative abnormal returns (e.g. Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Servaes and Zenner, 1996) .
For example, Michel et al. (1991) find that Drexel Burnham Lambert, one of the less prestigious banks, helps its clients earn the highest announcement abnormal returns, while First Boston, Bulge Bracket, achieves the poorest performance. In other words, bank reputation does not relate to better takeover performance. Servaes and Zenner (1996) show that acquirer announcement returns do not differ across in-house deals and deals advised by investment banks. The differences in announcement returns between acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are also insignificant.
1 Source: Thomson One Banker.
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Rau (2000) finds that acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks obtain higher announcement abnormal returns in tender offers but lower announcement abnormal returns in mergers compared to acquirers advised by lower-tier investment banks.
Furthermore, in both mergers and tender offers advised by top-tier investment banks, the completion rate of value-increasing transactions measured by announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is not significantly higher than that of valuedecreasing transactions. In contrast, compared to the proportion of tender offers with negative announcement CARs, second-tier banks help acquirers complete a significantly higher proportion of tender offers with positive announcement CARs.
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) use a unique method employing the difference between the transaction values at the announcement date and the effective date as a proxy for acquisition gains, and suggest that acquisition gains are inversely associated with the retention of top-tier investment bankers. Furthermore, Ismail (2010) reports that acquirers advised by first-tier banks obtain negative announcement returns, whereas second-tier banks help their clients gain positive returns around announcements.
In contrast, several researchers argue that top-tier advisors have superior abilities to identify synergistic targets and secure a larger proportion of synergy for their clients.
Therefore, top-tier advisors are capable of improving acquirer performance (Golubov et al., 2012) . Additionally, a higher reputation is associated with a higher market share. To maintain this market share, top-tier advisors must therefore maintain their reputation, which is achieved by providing superior service.
Specifically, Boone and Mulherin (2008) find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to top-tier advisors retained by acquirers but negatively related to top-tier advisors retained by targets. Therefore, top-tier advisors help their acquirer clients improve acquisition performance, and help their target clients gain highpremium offers. In other words, the retention of top-tier advisors is in the interest of employers. In addition, Golubov et al. (2012) argue that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors outperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors in public acquisitions.
The authors find that the retention of top-tier advisors led to $65.83 million shareholder gains for acquirers, on average, in public acquisitions during 1996-2009.
More importantly, their results suggest that the improvement in performance can be
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4 attributed to top-tier advisors' skills in identifying synergistic targets and negotiating higher shares of synergies for acquirers.
Previous literature examines the effects of investment bankers' reputation on acquirer performance. However, a firm's decisions to conduct acquisitions and to retain toptier advisors can be influenced by firm characteristics, such as firms' financial conditions. Acquirers with sufficient internal funds are more likely to conduct mergers, while they tend to forgo mergers if they are financially constrained (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999) . At the same time, cash-rich acquirers are more likely to retain top-tier advisors (Golubov et al., 2012) .
Jensen (1986) introduces the free cash flow hypothesis and argues that firms with excess cash reserves tend to make value-decreasing takeover deals. Similarly, Smith and Kim (1994) investigate the influence of free cash flow and financial slack on announcement abnormal returns. Their study shows that acquirers with high free cash flow obtain significantly negative announcement abnormal returns, whereas slackpoor acquirers gain significantly positive announcement abnormal returns. The returns to acquirers are highest in the acquisition of high free cash flow targets by slack-poor acquirers. In addition, Harford (1999) examines whether excess cash holdings stimulate top management to conduct takeover transactions and whether such deals (made by cash-rich acquirers) tend to destroy value. The author finds that cash richness is positively related to the probability of being an acquirer, but negatively related to acquirer announcement returns. Additionally, the post-merger long-term abnormal operating performance of both cash-rich and cash-poor acquirers is significantly negative and insignificant, respectively. In other words, cash-rich companies tend to conduct value-destroying takeovers. Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) find that financially unconstrained firms are more likely to exhibit overconfidence and overconfident CEOs tend to conduct value-destroying acquisitions, while firms with financial constraints are reluctant to raise external capital and forgo mergers if external finance is required.
Above-mentioned studies suggest that acquirers with different financial conditions exhibit different behaviors, which may help to explain the inconclusive evidence on the role of top-tier investment bankers in M&A deals. Specifically, acquirers with abundant cash flows tend to overestimate their ability to generate excess returns Croci et al., 2010; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986 (2000); Servaes and Zenner (1996) .
acquirers advised top-tier advisors give priority to deal completion. In other words, the effects of top-tier advisors are dependent on acquirer financial conditions. This research contributes to the M&A literature in the following two aspects. First, this paper sheds new light on puzzling empirical evidence on the effects of top-tier investment bankers. We highlight that the effects of top-tier advisors are sensitive to acquirer financial conditions. By examining abnormal returns to acquirers in different advisor-constraint groups, we provide novel evidence on the impact of top-tier advisors on acquirer performance. In particular, we find that top-tier advisors create value for their clients, but only if their clients are financially constrained acquirers.
Second, this paper emphasizes the importance of long-term effects of financial advisors. Most studies 5 only focus on investment bankers' effects on acquirer performance in the short term. However, financial advisors engage in not only deal negotiation but also post-deal integration. If the synergies identified and secured by top-tier advisors exist, then it will take time to transfer them into improved performance through post-deal integration and to demonstrate them to the market. To fill this void in research, this paper investigates the effects of advisors on acquirer performance in both the short and long term.
Our findings also have important strategic implications for practitioners. Prestigious investment bankers have superior abilities to improve their clients bargaining power and takeover performance. They also have stronger skills in deal completion.
However, our research suggests whether top-tier bankers can fulfill their potential is determine by clients' aims. We emphasize that the positive effects of top-tier investment bankers can be offset by acquirers' overconfidence. Stock markets reward acquirers who make acquisition decisions rationally and elaborately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data selection procedure and methodology. Section 3 discusses the empirical results.
Robustness tests are carried out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
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Methodology

Measure of advisor reputation
Following the method of Golubov et al. (2012) , this research uses a binary classification to distinguish between top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. Specifically, the top 10 banks measured by transaction value are classified as top-tier advisors and the others are classified as non-top-tier advisors 9 . Since the eighth and tenth advisors are very similar in transaction values and market shares, this paper uses the top 10 as the cut-off point, unlike the top-eight classification of Golubov et al. (2012) . 6 The original sample includes 203,415 deals. Acquirers are required to be public and targets are required to be public, private, or subsidiaries. A subsidiary firm is a separate company controlled by a parent company. Large public firms always own small private subsidiaries. Therefore, subsidiaries are included, independent on whether they are public or private. Using these criteria yields a sample of 105,565 deals. Takeover transaction values are required to be greater than or equal to $1 million, yielding a sample of 58,742 deals. Regulated industries such as financial and utility firms (Standard Industrial Classification codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively) are excluded, yielding a sample of 41,396 deals. Bankruptcy acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, restructurings, reverse takeovers, and privatizations are excluded from the sample, leaving a sample of 28,220 observations. 7 Calculating size-adjusted BHARs also requires data on the book value of equity from the Compustat database. 8 This paper uses the KZ index to measure financial constraints. To calculate the KZ index, COMPUSTAT items 1, 6, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 34, 60, 74, and 216 are required. 9 Appendix 1 shows the top 25 investment banks ranked by transaction value. Financial advisor league tables were downloaded from Thomson One Banker.
To prevent misclassification, this paper also pays attention to takeovers among investment banks. Baker et al., 2003; Guariglia and Yang, 2016; Li, 2011; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008) .
Following the aforementioned research, we calculate the KZ index using the following formula: .
Long-term performance
This paper use buy-and-hold abnormal returns to measure acquirer long-term performance in completed deals. Test statistics of long-term market-adjusted abnormal returns are misspecified due to rebalancing bias, new-listing bias, and skewness bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999) . To address these problems, Lyon et al. (1999) 10 Additional results obtained using an alternative methodology of constrained acquirers are discussed in Section 4 below.
where R it is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and R pt is the monthly return for reference portfolio in month t, calculated as
where R jt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and N the number of firms.
In each year, we construct 50 reference portfolios based on size and market-to-book. 
Multivariate analysis
The variation in acquirer abnormal returns can be explained by multiple variables.
Multivariate regressions are conducted to examine the effects of top-tier investment banks 11 . The following equation is employed to examine the relation between acquirer performance and the retention of top-tier investment banks:
where Performance i is the performance of acquirer i, and it can be either short-term or long-term. TopTier i is the key explanatory variable in this research and equals one if acquirer i retains a top-tier advisor for the deal. Constrained i (Unconstrained i ) is a dummy that equals one if acquirer i is financially constrained (unconstrained).
TopTier i Constrained i (TopTier i Unconstrained i ) is the interaction variable that 11 All the control variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 2.
interacts the TopTier i dummy and Constrained i (Unconstrained i ) dummy. We also control for year fixed effects (f t ) and industry fixed effects (f ind. 49.01% of deals are advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, respectively. Inhouse deals account for only 2.84% of the sample.
Insert Table 1 Here
Panel A of Table 1 shows both short-and long-term abnormal returns for acquirers.
For the full sample, acquirers' CAR [-2, 2] and BHAR36 average 1.08% and -37.25%, respectively. Deals advised by top-tier advisors generate significantly lower shortterm returns but significantly higher long-term returns for acquirers than deals advised by non-top-tier advisors.
Panel B of Table 1 presents statistics for firm characteristics. The KZ index for acquirers averages -14.61 over the sample period (1990-2012) . Additionally, acquirers that retain top-tier advisors have a higher KZ index than acquirers that retain 12 Results hold when the variables are winsorized at different levels, such as 2% and 98%, 3% and 97%, and 5% and 95%. 13 All the variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 2, where Panels A to D present acquirer short-and long-term abnormal returns, acquirer firm characteristics, deal characteristics, and market characteristics, respectively.
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12 non-top-tier advisors (-11.67 versus -18.12) , indicating that acquirers advised by toptier advisors are more constrained than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors.
Furthermore, compared with acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, acquirers that retain top-tier advisors tend to be larger firms, glamour firms, firms with higher leverage, firms with higher cash flows-to-equity ratio, firms with lower stock performance and lower risk, firms with more takeover experienced, and serial bidder.
Panel C shows the deal characteristics. Top-tier advisors are more likely to be retained in acquisitions with higher transaction value but lower relative size, public acquisitions, all-cash deals, hostile deals, competing bids, and tender offers. In addition, top-tier advisors take more time to complete deals and help their clients pay lower bid premiums. Top-tier advisors charge higher advisory fees. However, when the deal value is taken into consideration, acquirer pay lower relative advisory fees in deals advised by top-tier advisors.
Panel D presents the market characteristics. M&A Heat Degree is significantly negatively related to the retention of top-tier advisors, indicating that acquirers in a relatively cold M&A market tend to choose top-tier advisors. In addition, acquirers are more likely to choose top-tier advisors when stock market valuations are low or neutral.
The correlation matrix of variables used in regression analyses is shown in Table 2 .
The results show relatively low correlation between most independent variables. In particular, the correlation between TopTier dummy and other variables, and the correlations between KZ index and other variables are low, suggesting that it is unlikely to cause the concern about multicollinearity in regression analyses.
Insert Table 2 Here 
Empirical results
Univariate analysis
Short-term performance
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Insert Table 3 Here
Panel A of Table 3 shows the announcement abnormal returns for the sample of deals advised by investment banks. On average, constrained acquirers significantly outperform unconstrained acquirers by 1.49% (p = 0.000). This result is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis that cash-rich acquirers tend to conduct valuedestroying takeovers (Harford, 1999; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Kim, 1994) .
Panel B of Table 2 shows that deals advised by top-tier advisors generate significantly positive announcement abnormal returns for constrained acquirers, but significantly negative abnormal returns for unconstrained acquirers. For deals advised by top-tier advisors, constrained acquirers significantly outperform unconstrained acquirers by 3.19% (p = 0.000) on average, while median constrained acquirer outperform median unconstrained acquirer by 2.06% (p = 0.000).
Panel C of Table 3 retention of top-tier advisors does not lead to outperformance and even has negative effects on acquirer returns (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Servaes and Zenner, 1996) . In contrast, constrained acquirers (2003) suggest overvalued acquirers gain profits through acquisitions of undervalued targets, although long-term abnormal returns are negative, since acquirers will gain more negative returns without acquisitions.
Long-term performance
Insert Table 4 Here
Panels A to C represent acquirer long-term size-adjusted BHARs for the sample of completed deals advised by investment banks, deals advised by top-tier advisors, and 14 This paper only measures acquirer long-term performance for completed deals. Deal completion rate, time to resolution, bid premiums, and advisory fees 
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Insert Table 5 Here Insert Table 6 Here For the full sample, constrained acquirers pay significantly lower premiums than unconstrained acquirers, indicating that constrained acquirers care more about takeover performance than unconstrained acquirers do. On average, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors do, which suggests that top-tier advisors help their clients gain stronger bargaining power in the negotiation process and therefore secure more shares of synergy. On average, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay the lowest bid premium (38.21%).
Insert Table 7 Here However, if top-tier advisors are retained in complex deals, it is reasonable that toptier advisors charge higher advisory fees for deals with higher transaction value.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine relative advisory fees. The results suggest toptier advisors charge significantly lower relative advisory fees than non-top-tier advisors, which is consistent with the univariate test result in Golubov et al. (2012) . In other words, acquirers do not overpay top-tier advisors. In addition, it is not surprising that constrained acquirers pay significantly lower relative advisory fees than unconstrained acquirers do. However, the result is driven by the subsample of deals advised by top-tier advisors. For deals advised by non-top-tier advisors, there is no significant difference between constrained and unconstrained acquirers.
Insert Table 8 Here
Overall, for deals with investment banks' advisory service, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors gain the highest short-and long-term performance, pay the lowest bid premiums and relative advisory fees, and have the lowest deal completion rate. In contrast, unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have the highest deal completion rate, but gain the lowest announcement returns. They also gain lower long-term returns, and pay higher bid premiums and relative advisory fees.
These results suggest that constrained and unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors give priority to takeover performance and deal completion, respectively. In other words, constrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to chase performance, whereas unconstrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to complete their intended deals.
Multivariate analysis
We conduct multivariate regressions to further address the research question.
Specifically, we conduct regressions of short-and long-term abnormal returns on toptier advisors for deals advised by investment banks.
Short-term performance Insert Table 9 Here
The TopTier dummy, the key explanatory variable of this paper, is insignificant in specification 1, suggesting that top-tier advisors do not help acquirers to improve announcement performance. This result is consistent with the view that bank reputation does not have positive effects on acquirer performance (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Servaes and Zenner, 1996) . However, the univariate tests in section 4.1 suggest that the positive effects of top-tier advisors are only shown in the subsample of constrained acquirers, and the acquirers advised by top-tier advisors gain the highest announcement returns. In other words, constrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to chase performance. To examine this proposition, we add two dummy variables for constrained and unconstrained acquirers (Constrained dummy and Unconstrained dummy) and interact them with the TopTier dummy in specification 2. As a result, we find that the interaction between TopTier dummy and Constrained dummy is significantly positive, whereas the TopTierUnconstrained interaction is insignificant. The results suggest that the effects of top-tier advisors depend on acquirer financial conditions. More specifically, top-tier advisors improve their clients' announcement performance, but only for constrained acquirers. These results concur with those of Golubov et al.
(2012) that prestigious banks provide superior M&A advisory services. The
Constrained and Unconstrained dummies are insignificant in the specification 2, suggesting that financial constraint is not a determinant of acquirer announcement performance when firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. In addition, the TopTier dummy is significantly positive in the regression of constrained acquirer subsample (specification 3), but insignificant in the regressions of neutral and unconstrained acquirer subsamples (specifications 4 and 5), which is consistent with the result of specification 2. As can be seen from specification 3, top-tier advisors can
help constrained acquirers improve announcement abnormal returns by 1.45%.
However, for unconstrained and neutral acquirers, the retention of top-tier advisors does not enhance announcement performance. These results support the reputationquality mechanism; however, the impacts of bank reputation are sensitive to acquirers' financial conditions, which adds new evidence on the service quality of prestigious investment banks.
Furthermore, the variable LN(MV) is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, suggesting that larger firms tend to gain lower announcement returns. Moeller et al. is positively related to acquirer performance. The Diversification dummy is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, suggesting that diversifying deals destroy value for acquirers, which is consistent with the previous literature (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994) . The Low Valuation Market dummy is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, indicating that acquirers underperform around announcements, when the deals are conducted during a "bear" market.
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Bouwman et al. (2009) examine the difference in acquirer performance between acquisitions in "bull" and "bear" markets, and find that acquirers in high-valuation markets outperform in the short term compared to acquirers in low-valuation markets. Table 10 shows the results of the long-term multivariate analysis for completed deals with investment banks' advisory service. Specifications 1 and 2 represent the regressions of BHAR36 on top-tier advisors for all acquirers. Specifications 3, 4, and 5 represent the regressions for constrained, neutral, and unconstrained acquirers, respectively.
Our result is qualitatively similar to that of Bouwman et al. (2009).
Long-term performance
Insert Table 10 Here
The coefficient of the TopTier dummy is positive for specification 1 (regression for the full sample), suggesting that top-tier advisors improve acquirers' performance in the long term. The result supports the view that prestigious banks have superior skills (Golubov et al., 2012) . Most studies only examine the effects of bank reputation on acquirer short-term performance. This result adds new evidence to the research on the reputation-quality mechanism, and highlights the importance of the long-term effects of top-tier advisors. However, the TopTier dummy loses its significance in the specification 2, when the interactions between top-tier status and financial constraint are added in the regression. In particular, the TopTierUnconstrained interaction is insignificant, whereas the TopTierConstrained interaction is significantly positive, suggesting that top-tier advisors improve their clients' long-term performance for constrained acquirers rather than unconstrained acquirers. In addition to the regressions of short-term performance, the result further shows that the effects of toptier advisors differ across acquirers with different financial conditions. In addition,
Constrained and Unconstrained dummies are insignificant in specification 2, suggesting that financial constraint has no significant influence on acquirer long-term performance when firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. 
Robustness test
This section addresses the robustness of our results.
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Financial advisor classification
We evaluate whether our results are sensitive to different financial advisor classifications. Specifically, we follow the method of Golubov et al. (2012), using the top-eight cut-off point. 16 In addition, since the investment bank league table is market share-based, we also use different thresholds (e.g. 8% and 10%) of market share to define top-tier advisors. Furthermore, since the sample period of this research is longer than two decades, we also measure bank ranking separately over 1990s and post-2000 period. To examine whether the league table is sensitive to the time intervals, we also examine the bank ranking over each three-year period. By using different definitions of top-tier advisors, our results are not qualitatively changed.
Measure of financial constraint
To examine whether our results are sensitive to the measure of financial constraint, we also use the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) calculated, Size is winsorized at (the log of) $4.5 billion, and Age is winsorized at 37 years.
Companies with higher SA index, lower age, and larger size are more financially constrained. By using SA index, age, and size to measure financial constraint, our results are qualitatively similar.
Short-term performance
We use alternative event windows and valuation models to measure acquirer shortterm performance. Specifically, we calculate CARs over the [-1, 1] and [-5, 5] windows. In addition, we apply the market model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the Fama-French-momentum four-factor model to compute announcement abnormal returns. The results are not sensitive to these variations.
Long-term performance
We also use alternative event windows and valuation models to measure acquirer long-term performance. Specifically, we calculate BHARs over 12-month and 24-month windows. In addition, we calculate market-adjusted BHARs. For size-adjusted BHARs, we also use following alternative formula:
where R it is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and R pt is the monthly buyand-hold return for the reference portfolio in month t, calculated as
with R jt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and n the number of firms.
The results are robust to these variations.
Other issues
To control for the influence of outliers, we also winsorize all the quantitative variables at different levels, such as 2% and 98%, 3% and 97%, and 5% and 95%. In addition, bid premium is measured as the difference between offer price and target price four weeks prior to the announcement divided by the latter term. To calculate bid
premiums, we also measure target prices one week and one day before the announcement. We also use a binary classification to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained acquirers. Specifically, the highest third of acquirers ranked by KZ index are defined as constrained, and the others are defined as unconstrained acquirers. However, the results are not sensitive to the above variations.
Conclusions
This paper examines whether top-tier investment bankers can help acquirers gain superior takeover performance in both the short and long term and, more importantly, whether the effects of top-tier advisors are dependent on acquirer financial constraints. In line with Malmendier and Tate (2008) that financially unconstrained acquirers tend to be overconfident and therefore make value-decreasing takeovers, this paper show that the retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer performance, but only for constrained acquirers. Specifically, in the short term, retaining top-tier advisors can help constrained acquirers improve announcement abnormal returns by 1.45%, after controlling for firm, deal, and market characteristics. However, the retention of top-tier advisors does not improve short-term performance for unconstrained and neutral acquirers. In the long term, the retention of top-tier advisors is positively related to acquirer performance. The result is driven by the sub-sample of constrained acquirers. For constrained acquirers, the retention of top-tier advisors improves long-term performance by 24.27%, after firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. In contrast, the effects of top-tier advisors are insignificant for unconstrained and neutral acquirers. Therefore, the results indicate that the effects of top-tier advisors on acquirer performance differ across acquirers with different levels of financial constraints. The retention of top-tier advisors creates value for relatively constrained acquirers in both the short and long term.
Acquirers choose appropriate investment bankers to conduct M&A deals.
Correspondingly, financial advisors also have rights and opportunities to determine whether they accept the offers. Since top-tier advisors tend to be in high demand, there is concern that top-tier advisors select their acquirer clients to maintain their reputation. In other words, it is possible that top-tier advisors cherry-pick acquirer clients with given characteristics to generate excess returns. However, empirical
evidence suggests this concern is not necessary. In addition, the results for deal completion rate, bid premiums, and acquirer relative advisory fees can help explain the variation in acquirer performance. In general, deal completion is independent of bank reputation. Top-tier advisors should have stronger ability to complete deals. It is possible that top-tier advisors emphasize on deal quality, and deter value-destroying deals for their clients. However, for deals with investment bank involvement, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have lowest deal completion rate, whereas unconstrained acquirers with top-tier advisors have the highest completion rate. Furthermore, constrained acquirers advised by toptier advisors also pay lowest bid premiums and relative advisory fees. In contrast, unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay higher advisory fees. If unconstrained acquirers chase performance, they should expect to gain higher bargaining power and therefore pay lower bid premiums. However, the highest advisory fees do not translate into greater bargaining power in the negotiation process.
Unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay higher bid premiums. These results suggest that unconstrained acquirers care less about overpayment and takeover performance, and give priority to deal completion.
Overall, our results suggest that different acquirers have different aims. Constrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to gain superior performance, while unconstrained acquirers retain top-tier advisors to complete their intended deals. This table presents results of the OLS regression of long-term performance for the sample of completed deals advised by investment banks. In these models acquirer BHAR36 are regressed against a vector of explanatory variables. Acquirers are divided into three groups based on KZ index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) third of acquirers ranked by their KZ index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle third of acquirers are classified as neutral acquirers. Specifications 1 and 2 report the results for all acquirers. Specifications 3, 4 and 5 report the results for constrained, neutral and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. All variables are defined in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. In all models, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. All quantitative variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) Nain (2009). Specifically, this paper initially detrend the monthly P/E ratios of the S&P 500 from 1985 to 2009. Subsequently, each month is classified as below or above average base on whether the detrended P/E ratio of the month is lower or higher than the past five-year average. Finally, the lowest 50% of below average months are identified as "Low Valuation Market", while the highest 50% of above average months are identified as "High Valuation Market". Other month are defined as "Neutral valuation Market". The monthly P/E ratios of the S&P 500 are acquired from Datastream.
Neutral Valuation Market
Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in neutral valuation month.
Low Valuation Market
Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in low valuation month.
